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Torts
by Deron R. Hicks*
and
Mitchell M. McKinney"
I.

PREMISES LIABILITY

A.

Slip-and-Fall
Notwithstanding the Georgia Supreme Court's attempt to resolve the
lingering debate over Georgia's slip-and-fall jurisprudence in its 1997
decision in Robinson v. Kroger Co.,' the decision, in fact, merely altered
the terms of that debate. While the court dealt swiftly with the rigid
application of its prior decision in Alterman Foods v. Ligon,' the
decision raised troubling new questions about the proper roles of the
court and jury in resolving future cases. The two decisions included in
this Article reflect how the Georgia Court of Appeals has struggled to
apply Robinson's new standard.
In Laffoday v. Winn Dixie Atlanta, Inc.,' the court of appeals reversed
the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant in a
slip-and-fall action.4 Plaintiff, who was a representative of a greeting
card company, maintained the greeting card section of defendant's
grocery store for over a year. Prior to the incident that led to her civil
action, plaintiff visited the particular grocery store at issue approximate-

* Partner in the firm of Page, Scrantom, Sprouse, Tucker & Ford, P.C., Columbus,
Georgia. University of Georgia (B.F.A., 1990); Mercer University, Walter F. George School
of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1993). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of Page, Scrantom, Sprouse, Tucker & Ford, P.C., Columbus,
Georgia. Mercer University (B.B.A., 1995); University of Alabama (J.D., 1998). Member,
State Bars of Georgia and Alabama.
1. 268 Ga. 735, 493 S.E.2d 403 (1997).
2. 246 Ga. 620, 272 S.E.2d 327 (1980).
3. 235 Ga. App. 832, 510 S.E.2d 598 (1998).
4. Id. at 832, 510 S.E.2d at 598.

462

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

ly twice a week. Plaintiff's duties required her to walk through the
produce preparation area, located behind double doors in the rear of the
store, to access a storage area. On the day of the incident, plaintiff fell
in the produce preparation area after receiving a page from the store's
manager. According to plaintiff's testimony, she was looking at the door
at the time she fell.' Plaintiff further testified that she knew she had
"slipped on water because her clothing was wet after her fall and she
saw water on the floor."' However, plaintiff admitted that the produce
department manager had warned her to be careful about water in the
produce area.7 Plaintiff also testified that "she 'was aware that this
area could collect water'" and "that she knew frozen produce was
prepped in this area and that water could leak from those items."8
According to plaintiff, although she knew that there was water in the
produce preparation area on the day of the incident, she "denied that
before her fall, she was actually aware of the particular water which
caused her to slip. "9
The produce department manager testified that shortly before the
accident he was aware of a puddle of water in the general area where
plaintiff fell. The department manager instructed employees to clean up
the puddle; however, the manager testified that moisture was still
evident on the floor after it was dry-mopped, "that it was a 'little bit'
wet, and that the linoleum floor was going to be 'a little bit slick' after
it had been dry-mopped because the floor could not be completely
dried."1 ° The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment on the basis that plaintiff "'had equal or greater knowledge of
the specific hazard which resulted in her fall.'"'
On appeal the court of appeals noted that although the trial court's
decision had been rendered prior to the supreme court's decision in
Robinson v.Kroger Co.,' 2 the appellate court was bound to apply
Robinson to the facts of the case.'" Quoting from the decision in
Robinson, the court of appeals noted:
"[Iun order to recover for injuries sustained in a slip-and-fall action, an
invitee must prove (1) that the defendant had actual or constructive

5.

Id. at 833, 510 S.E.2d at 599.

6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.

9. Id.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 833-34, 510 S.E.2d at 599.
Id. at 832, 510 S.E.2d at 598.
268 Ga. 735, 493 S.E.2d 403 (1997).
235 Ga. App. at 834, 510 S.E.2d at 598-99.
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knowledge of the hazard; and (2) that the plaintiff lacked knowledge of
the hazard despite the exercise of ordinary care due to actions or
conditions within the control of the owner/occupier." Thus, the true
ground of liability in a slip-and-fall action remains the owner/occupier's
superior knowledge of the hazard.14
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision on the basis
that defendant had superior knowledge of the particular hazard which
gave rise to the dangerous condition. 5 The court noted that "[allthough she knew that water was present on the floor of the produce
preparation area before her fall, there [was] no evidence that [plaintiff]
16
actually knew about the particular wetness which caused her to fall."
In reaching its decision, the court of appeals noted the supreme court's
admonition in Robinson
"that an invitee's failure to exercise ordinary care is not established as
a matter of law by the invitee's admission that he did not look at the
site on which he placed his foot or that he could have seen the hazard
had he visually examined the floor before taking the step which lead
to his downfall."' 7
The decision in Laffoday, however, appears to take this proposition a
step further. Significantly, plaintiff in Laffoday knew that the produce
preparation area was wet, was aware that the area accumulated water,
and had been warned prior to her fall to be careful about water in the
area."8 Nonetheless, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's
decision because plaintiff lacked knowledge of the specific area of
wetness upon which she fell in the produce preparation area.' 9 That
is, reviewing the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff's
knowledge of the general hazardous condition of the area where she fell
did not constitute knowledge equal to that of defendant, who may have
had knowledge of the specific hazard in the produce preparation area
where plaintiff slipped.2"
In reaching its decision, the court of appeals also quoted from the
portion of the decision in Robinson that suggested that a plaintiff may
present evidence of the exercise of reasonable care by setting forth
evidence that the plaintiff was distracted by "'something in the control

14. Id. at 832, 510 S.E.2d at 598 (quoting Robinson, 268 Ga. at 748-49, 493 S.E.2d at
414).
15. Id. at 833, 510 S.E.2d at 598.
16. Id. at 834, 510 S.E.2d at 599.
17. Id., 510 S.E.2d at 599-600 (quoting Robinson, 268 Ga. at 748, 493 S.E.2d at 414).
18. Id. at 833, 510 S.E.2d at 599.

19. Id. at 834, 510 S.E.2d at 599.
20. Id.
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of the owner/occupier and of such a nature that the owner/occupier knew
or should have known of its distractive qualit[ies].'"21 In this respect
the court appears to suggest that because the page by the grocery store
manager "startled" plaintiff, it constituted "some evidence of the exercise
of reasonable care" in that the grocery store manager "knew or should
have known of its distractive quality."22 This particular aspect of the
court of appeals decision is troubling. There is little doubt that when a
person is paged over an intercom system at a grocery store, department
store, or other public forum, it is almost certain to be a startling or
unexpected event; however, intercom systems often provide a valuable
public service. To suggest that the use of an intercom system is of such
a distractive quality as to negate the failure of plaintiffs to exercise
reasonable care for their own safety is unsettling.
Perhaps more unsettling, however, is the court's holding that summary
judgment in favor of a proprietor would not be appropriate even when
the invitee has been warned of a generally dangerous condition and has
admitted knowledge of that condition. 23 Exactly how far this concept
should extend is uncertain. Would a "Caution: Wet Floor" sign have
been sufficient to shift the burden to plaintiff to exercise care for her
own safety? Perhaps not, particularly in a situation in which the
plaintiff has already admitted knowledge of a dangerous condition in the
general area. To this end, the court's decision in Laffoday suggests an
unreasonable burden that few, if any, proprietors could satisfy.
In contrast to the decision in Laffoday, the Georgia Court of Appeals
in Lovins v. Kroger CO. 24 affirmed the grant of summary judgment to
defendant grocery store on the basis that plaintiff failed to establish
defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the foreign substance
that caused plaintiff to slip and fall.25 In Lovins an employee of the
grocery store had placed spinach dip and crackers on a table outside the
delicatessen for customers to sample. 2' After setting up the sample
display, the employee "inspected the floor in the area, saw that it was
clean, and went behind the nearby counter to prepare a cheese
basket." 21 Within ten minutes plaintiff slipped on spinach dip and fell.
The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by
defendant on the basis that there was no evidence that defendant had

21. Id., 510 S.E.2d at 600 (quoting Robinson, 268 Ga. at 748, 493 S.E.2d at 414).
22. Id.

23.

Id.

24.

236 Ga. App. 585, 512 S.E.2d 2 (1999).

25. Id. at 587, 512 S.E.2d at 5.
26. Id. at 585, 512 S.E.2d at 3.
27. Id.
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actual or constructive knowledge that the foreign substance was on the
floor.2"
In affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment, the court of
appeals held there was no evidence that defendant had actual or
constructive knowledge of the foreign substance.2 9 As in Laffoday, the
court first noted that for a plaintiff to recover in a slip-and-fall action,
the plaintiff "must prove (1) that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the [foreign substance], and (2) that the plaintiff
lacked knowledge of the [foreign substance] despite the exercise of
reasonable care."3 ° The court held that there was no evidence of any
actual knowledge on the part of defendant or its employees of the foreign
substance on the floor."' Plaintiff, however, suggested that actual
knowledge could "be inferred from the employee's testimony that she did
not see any customers passing through the area or sampling the dip
between the time she set out the dip and the time [plaintiff] fell."32
Therefore, according to plaintiff, because there was no evidence that
other customers had dropped the dip, then the dip must have been
dropped by the employee.33 However, the court of appeals noted that
the reason the employee did not see any customers in the area was
because, according to her testimony, she had her back turned to the
display.34 Accordingly, because the court determined that the evidence
presented as to actual knowledge was "too uncertain or speculative," it
refused to infer from such evidence the existence of actual knowledge on
the part of defendant.35
The court then noted that constructive knowledge could be established
in either of the following ways:
(i) by presenting evidence that an employee of the defendant was in the
immediate area of the dangerous condition and could have easily seen
the substance and removed the hazard; or (ii) by presenting evidence
that the substance was on the floor for such a time that (a) it would
have been discovered had the proprietor exercised reasonable care in
inspecting the premises and (b) upon being discovered, the substance
would have been cleaned up had the proprietor exercised reasonable
care in cleaning the premises.36
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

587, 512 S.E.2d at 5.
585, 512 S.E.2d at 3.
586, 512 S.E.2d at 4.
585, 512 S.E.2d at 3-4.
585-86, 512 S.E.2d at 4.
585, 512 S.E.2d at 4.
586, 512 S.E.2d at 4.
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With respect to the first prong of the constructive knowledge analysis,
plaintiff argued that because the employee was in the immediate area
where plaintiff fell, the employee could easily have seen the substance
and removed it from the floor.37 Significantly, however, the court
rejected this argument and held that evidence "that an employee was38
merely working in the area of a foreign substance was not enough."
Rather, "[tihe employee must have been in a position to have easily seen
and removed the substance."3 9 Accordingly, based upon (1) the
testimony of the employee that she had her back turned to the display
at the time of the incident, and (2) the testimony that the display case
in the delicatessen would have blocked her view had she been looking,
the court declined to find constructive knowledge under the first prong
of the constructive knowledge analysis.40
As to the second prong of the constructive knowledge analysis, the
court noted that the evidence established that the floor had been
inspected ten minutes prior to the fall and that no foreign substance had
been found.4 1 Accordingly, the court held that plaintiff failed to present
"evidence establishing that Kroger employees would have discovered the
substance and cleaned it up had they exercised reasonable care in
inspecting and cleaning the premises."42
The court also rejected plaintiff's contention that the decision in
Robinson v. Kroger Co.4" required reversal of the trial court's decision." The court noted that the decision in Robinson "focused on the
issue of a plaintiff's knowledge of the foreign substance, not the
defendant's actual or constructive knowledge. Robinson did not change
the plaintiff's burden concerning the defendant's knowledge.
As the supreme court noted in Robinson, the analysis of slip-and-fall
cases in the years subsequent to Alterman Foods v. Ligon 41 tended to
focus on the second prong of the slip-and-fall analysis-whether
plaintiffs exercised reasonable care for their own safety.47 However, it
appears from the decision in Lovins that at least one panel of the court
of appeals is inclined to turn the focus back to the first prong of the slip-

37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 587, 512 S.E.2d at 4.

42. Id.
43. 268 Ga. 735, 493 S.E.2d 403 (1997).
44.

236 Ga. App. at 587, 512 S.E.2d at 4.

45. Id.
46.
47.

246 Ga. 620, 272 S.E.2d 327 (1980).
268 Ga. at 736-37, 493 S.E.2d at 405-06.
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and-fall analysis and thus provide proprietors at least some guidelines
for the avoidance of liability. It remains to be seen if the remainder of
the court of appeals will follow the approach set forth in Lovins.
B.

CriminalAttacks

In Jackson v. Post Properties,Inc.," the court of appeals reversed the
grant of summary judgment to defendant landlord on the basis that a
question of fact existed as to whether the landlord had exercised
ordinary care to prevent a foreseeable third-party criminal attack upon
its tenants.49 Plaintiff in Jackson "was raped by an unknown assailant
after moving from an upper level unit to a ground level unit at
[defendant's apartment complex]."" Plaintiff was a resident of an
apartment complex owned by defendant and was originally a resident of
an upper level unit in the apartment complex. While plaintiff resided
in an upper level unit, another tenant in the apartment complex was
raped while residing in a ground floor apartment. The evidence was
undisputed that plaintiff knew of the prior rape. 5 In response to the
prior rape, the apartment complex "conducted town-hall type meetings
with the residents and distributed community newsletters to address the
residents' safety concerns."5 2 Although it is somewhat unclear from the
decision, it appears that defendant either provided additional thumbscrew window locks or provided additional instructions with respect to
the proper usage of previously installed thumbscrew window locks.
Plaintiff subsequently moved from her upper level apartment to a
ground floor unit despite knowledge of the prior rape and knowledge
that the assailant had not been apprehended. The trial court apparently
granted summary judgment to defendant on the basis that both plaintiff
and defendant had equal knowledge of the risk of the third-party
criminal attack.53 On appeal the court of appeals reversed.54
The court of appeals first noted the general rule "that a landlord is not
an ensurer of his tenant's safety."5 5 However, the court noted that "the
landlord does have a duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent foreseeable third-party criminal attacks upon tenants."56 The court further

48.
49.
50.
51.

236 Ga. App. 701, 513 S.E.2d 259 (1999).
Id. at 701, 513 S.E.2d at 259.
Id., 513 S.E.2d at 261.
Id. at 702, 513 S.E.2d at 261.

52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id. at 701, 513 S.E.2d at 261.
Id.
Id.

56. Id. (citing Sturbridge Partners v. Walker, 267 Ga. 785, 785-86, 482 S.E.2d 339, 340

(1997)).
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noted that a "tenant will be precluded from recovery ... as a matter of
law against the landlord when he or she has equal or superior knowledge of the risk and fails to exercise ordinary care for his or her own
safety."57 In reaching its decision, the court agreed that plaintiff had
equal knowledge of the risk of a third-party criminal attack when she
moved to the ground floor apartment. 58 However, according to the
court, the central issue was whether plaintiff "could have taken any
action in the exercise of ordinary care to avoid the consequences of
[defendant's] alleged negligence. " "
The court held that questions of fact, regarding whether defendant
was negligent, existed in four respects.60 First, the court held that a
question of fact existed as to whether the thumbscrew window locks
provided by defendant to its tenants were properly used.6 Second, the
court held that a question of fact existed as to whether the "rape was the
result of the flimsy nature of the windows installed when the ...
apartments were built." 2 Third, the court held that a question of fact
existed as to whether a courtesy officer employed by defendant was
utilized in a negligent manner.'
Finally, the court held that a
question of fact existed as to whether defendant adequately maintained
the property's lighting and landscaping."
To some extent, however, the decision reached by the court of appeals
in Jackson begs the question. The court did not address the underlying
question of whether defendant's knowledge of one prior criminal attack
was sufficient to place defendant on notice that a subsequent criminal
attack was reasonably foreseeable. It is certainly not unforeseeable in
a large metropolitan area that an isolated crime of violence may occur
at an apartment complex. However, the direction taken by the court of
appeals suggests that a landlord must view each isolated incident of
criminal violence as a potential precursor of subsequent acts of a similar
nature. The failure of a landlord to take immediate responsive action
could constitute grounds for liability. Moreover, as in the decision in
Jackson, even if the landlord takes some action to protect its tenants, it
may not be enough. Accordingly, statements to the contrary notwithstanding, the court's decision in Jackson undermines the general
proposition that a landlord is not an ensurer of a tenant's safety.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 701-02, 513 S.E.2d at 261.
Id. at 702, 513 S.E.2d at 261.
Id., 513 S.E.2d at 262.
Id. at 702-04, 513 S.E.2d at 262-63.
Id. at 702, 513 S.E.2d at 262.
Id. at 703, 513 S.E.2d at 263.
Id. at 704, 513 S.E.2d at 263.
Id.
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II. DAMAGES
In Alternative Health Care Systems, Inc. v. McCown," the court of
appeals held defendant's failure to present a special verdict form or to
object to the form of a verdict constituted a waiver of any objection that
the jury verdict entered in favor of plaintiff resulted in a double
recovery.6 6 Plaintiff filed suit against defendant Alternative Health
Care Systems and others on the basis that employees of defendant
"wrongfully instructed an eye bank to remove [plaintiff's] deceased
husband's eyes after she had refused permission, then concealed their
actions from her and falsified records pertaining to the eye removal." 7
Plaintiff brought suit "for trespass to and mutilation of her husband's
body, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence per se
[under] O.C.G.A. § 31-22-6, wanton failure on the part of [defendant] to
train and supervise its employees, punitive damages, and bad faith
penalties.'
In a bifurcated proceeding under Official Code of Georgia Annotated
("O.C.G.A.") section 51-12-5.1,69 the jury entered a verdict after the first
portion of the bifurcated proceeding and awarded plaintiff compensatory
damages. According to the jury, the conduct of defendant also warranted
an award of punitive damages. The jury subsequently returned an
award of punitive damages against defendant in the second phase of the
bifurcated proceeding.7
On appeal defendant contended that the verdict entered by the jury
was illegal because it constituted a double recovery for plaintiff.7 1 In
particular, defendant alleged that the award of punitive damages to
plaintiff "was foreclosed by an award for damages to the peace and
feelings of [plaintiff] under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6. "72 Moreover, defendant

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

237 Ga. App. 355, 514 S.E.2d 691 (1999).
Id. at 357, 514 S.E.2d at 695.
Id. at 355, 514 S.E.2d at 694.
Id.
This statute provides:
An award of punitive damages must be specifically prayed for in a complaint.
In any case in which punitive damages are claimed, the trier of fact shall first
resolve from the evidence produced at trial whether an award of punitive damages
shall be made. This finding shall be made specially through an appropriate form
of verdict, along with the other required findings.
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(d)(1) (Supp. 1999).
70. 237 Ga. App. at 355, 514 S.E.2d at 694.
71. Id. at 356, 514 S.E.2d at 695.
72. Id., 514 S.E.2d at 694. This statute provides:
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contended the jury verdict was improper because plaintiff "was required
to make an election before trial between damages under O.C.G.A. § 5112-6 and special damages."" The court of appeals, however, affirmed
the jury's verdict. 4
In reaching its decision, the court first rejected defendant's contention
that the award of punitive damages was foreclosed by an award of
damages under O.C.G.A. section 51-12-6. 7" Citing the decision in
Southern General Insurance Co. v. Holt,76 the court of appeals noted
that "a jury may award different measures of damages on multiple
claims if the evidence establishes several distinct torts."7 The court
then noted that plaintiff pleaded a number of "distinct tortious acts and
causes of action." 78 The court stated, "while the jury's award theoretically could have been based entirely on a claim of injury to the peace
and feelings of [plaintiff], it is equally possible that the jury awarded
compensatory damages and punitive damages
on one of [plaintiff's] other
79
claims or on a combination of claims."
Likewise, the court of appeals rejected defendant's contention that
plaintiff was required to make an election between damages under
O.C.G.A. section 51-12-6 and special damages.8" Again, the court noted
that plaintiff had asserted multiple claims against defendant "based
upon different evidence." l Despite the fact that defendant was on
notice of the several distinct claims asserted by plaintiff, the court noted
that "appellants failed to present a special verdict form or object to the
form of the verdict on any ground [presented on appeal]." s According
to the court, "[w]ithout special interrogatories in the verdict form to
distinguish between [plaintiff's] various claims and causes of action, any
attempt to determine the jury's reasoning in calculating its award is

In a tort action in which the entire injury is to the peace, happiness, or feelings
of the plaintiff, no measure of damages can be prescribed except the enlightened
consciences of impartial jurors. In such an action, punitive damages under Code
Section 51-12-5 or Code Section 51-12-5.1 shall not be awarded.
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6 (Supp. 1999).
73. 237 Ga. App. at 356-57, 514 S.E.2d at 695.
74. Id. at 355, 514 S.E.2d at 694.
75. Id. at 356, 514 S.E.2d at 695.
76. 200 Ga. App. 759, 768, 409 S.E.2d 852, 860 (1991).
77. 237 Ga. App. at 356, 514 S.E.2d at 695.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 357, 514 S.E.2d at 695.
81. Id.

82. Id.
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futile." 3 In this respect, the court declined to "speculate as to the
findings of fact supporting the verdict. "s4
In Troncalli v. Jones, 5 the court of appeals applied the guidelines set
forth by the supreme court in the 1998 decision in Webster v. Boyett 8
to determine whether evidence of prior similar acts would be admissible
in the liability phase of a bifurcated procedure under O.C.G.A. section
51-12-5.1.1 7 Plaintiff in Troncalli sued defendant for stalking, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional
distress, invasion of privacy, and assault and battery after defendant
allegedly engaged in a pattern of intimidating and harassing behavior
directed at plaintiff. In a bifurcated procedure, the court permitted
plaintiff to introduce evidence of a prior pattern of harassment and
intimidation by defendant against another female.8 s During the course
of the hearing on a motion in limine filed by defendant with respect to
the admissibility of the prior acts, the trial court determined that the
prior acts "were sufficiently similar to those against [plaintiff] to show
a bent of mind or course of conduct."89 Based on this finding, the trial
court permitted plaintiff to introduce evidence of the prior acts. After a
jury verdict in favor of plaintiff that included an award of punitive
damages, defendant appealed.9 Although the court of appeals reversed
the trial court's decision on other grounds, the court of appeals upheld
the trial court's decision to permit plaintiff to introduce evidence of the
prior acts. 91
As noted above, the trial court held that evidence of prior acts was
admissible on the basis that such evidence could prove "intent, motive
and bent of mind."9 2 In affirming the decision of the trial court on this
particular ruling, the court of appeals noted that "'[s]imilar acts are
admissible in evidence, if committed or proposed at or about the same
time, and when the same motive may reasonably be supposed to
exist.'" 93

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 237 Ga. App. 10, 514 S.E.2d 478 (1999).
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

269 Ga. 191, 496 S.E.2d 459 (1998).
237 Ga. App. at 16-17, 514 S.E.2d at 484.
Id. at 10-12, 514 S.E.2d at 479-81.
Id. at 15, 514 S.E.2d at 483.
Id. at 10-16, 514 S.E.2d at 480-83.
Id. at 17, 514 S.E.2d at 484.
Id. at 16, 514 S.E.2d at 484.
Id., 514 S.E.2d at 483 (quoting John W. Rooker & Assocs., Inc. v. Wilen Mfg. Co.,

211 Ga. App. 519, 520, 439 S.E.2d 740, 741 (1993) (citations and punctuation omitted)).
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The court of appeals then turned to the question of whether the
evidence of the prior acts "improperly bolstered [plaintiff's] case for
punitive damages."9 The court noted that the "question in Webster
was whether the evidence of the similar acts was relevant in determining liability for punitive damages and, if so, the proper procedure to be
followed in handling the admission of the evidence."95 The court also
noted that although the supreme court recognized the "potentially
prejudicial effect that evidence of prior acts could have on a jury during
the liability portion of the trial, [it] declined to enunciate a bright-line
rule."96 Rather, the supreme court left such decisions to the discretion
of the trial judge.97 In this respect, the court of appeals noted the
"'general rule is that trial judges may exercise discretion in excluding
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the risk that its admission will confuse the issue, mislead the jury, or
create substantial danger of undue prejudice.'"" In balancing these
factors, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision and held
that the evidence of the prior acts was "relevant to establish liability for
punitive damages in the first phase of the trial.""
Although the court of appeals decision fails to provide much guidance
as to the exact basis for its decision with respect to the admissibility of
the evidence of prior acts in the first phase of the bifurcated proceeding,
some conclusions can be drawn from the court's decision. First, unlike
the decision in Webster, an independent ground existed in Troncalli for
the admission of evidence of the prior acts as to the issue of liability. In
this respect, the prejudicial effect that such evidence would have was
obviously negated by the fact that the evidence may have been
admissible on other grounds.
Further, the court of appeals noted that plaintiff's case was based on
allegations that "[defendant's] acts were intentional." " Again, unlike
the decision in Webster, in which the supreme court held that the trial
court properly exercised its discretion in excluding evidence of prior acts
of negligence,1°" the underlying tort in Troncalli, as well as the prior
acts, was based on allegations that defendant's actions were intentional.

94. Id.
95. Id. at 17, 514 S.E.2d at 484.
96. Id.

97. Id.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. (quoting Webster, 269 Ga. at 195, 496 S.E.2d at 463).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
269 Ga. at 197, 496 S.E.2d at 464.
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STALKING AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

In Troncalli v. Jones,"2 the court of appeals rejected the argument
that the passage
of O.C.G.A. section 16-5-90 created a new tort of
"stalking.""3
Plaintiff in Troncalli sued defendant for negligent
infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and assault and
battery. Plaintiff brought suit after defendant touched her breast,
verbally threatened her, followed her on numerous occasions, and visited
her home without invitation after she advised defendant that his
advances were unwelcome. After a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff,
defendant appealed." ° On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the
judgment entered by the trial court on the basis that stalking is not
recognized as a tort under Georgia law.'
O.C.G.A. section 16-5-90(a) provides, in part:
A person commits the offense of stalking when he or she follows,
places under surveillance, or contacts another person at or about a
place or places without the consent of the other person for the purpose
of harassing and intimidating the other person ....For the purposes
of this article, the term 'harassing and intimidating' means a knowing
and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes
emotional distress by placing such person in reasonable fear for such
person's safety ....106
Although the definition of stalking set forth in O.C.G.A. section 16-5-90
further enumerates the offense as a misdemeanor, and possibly a felony
if the stalking is repeated or aggravated in some manner, the court of
appeals held that the code section did not automatically create the tort
of stalking.'1 7 The court noted it is a well-settled rule of law that
"'[tihe violation of a penal statute does not automatically give rise to a
civil cause of action on the part of one who is injured thereby.'"'08
Moreover, according to the court, "although O.C.G.A. § 16-5-90 establishes the public policy of the state, nothing in its provisions creates a
private cause of action in tort in favor of the victim."'0 9 The court then
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237 Ga. App. 10, 514 S.E.2d 478 (1999).
Id. at 12, 514 S.E.2d at 481.
Id. at 10-11, 514 S.E.2d at 479-80.
Id. at 13, 514 S.E.2d at 481.
O.C.G.A. § 16-5-90(a) (1999).
237 Ga. App. at 12, 514 S.E.2d at 481.
Id. (quoting Cechman v. Travis, 202 Ga. App. 255, 256, 414 S.E.2d 282 (1991)).
Id.
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held that the jury's verdict could not be sustained because the claim of
stalking was an essential part of plaintiff's cause of action." °
However, the court of appeals decision is somewhat puzzling in at
least one respect. If the conduct of defendant, as alleged by plaintiff,
was actionable if classified as intentional infliction of emotional distress,
invasion of privacy, or assault and battery (or a combination thereof),
then why should the court not recognize stalking as an actionable tort?
The practical result of the court of appeals decision will be to require
that victims of stalking creatively plead their actions as claims for the
above-mentioned torts to bring suit.
IV.

PRODUCTS LIABmITY

A.

Risk- Utility Analysis of Strict Liability
In Ogletree v. Navistar International Transportation Corp.,"'
plaintiff brought suit after her husband was fatally injured when a
fertilizer-spreader truck backed over him. Plaintiff sued the manufacturer of the cab and chassis of the fertilizer truck and alleged the
manufacturer was negligent in not installing an audible back-up alarm
mechanism that would signal when the truck was in reverse. On the
day of the accident, a customer drove a truck to pick up a load of
fertilizer from Colbert's Seed Company. Decedent was an employee of
Colbert's Seed Company and rode with the customer to direct the
customer to the correct storage area for the fertilizer. The process of
loading the fertilizer involved parking the truck in front of a storage
trailer called a "Killebrew," which contained a hydraulic motor that
would automatically load the fertilizer into the truck. The customer
pulled alongside the Killebrew, and plaintiff's husband exited the truck
to continue the loading process. As the customer backed the truck
alongside the Killebrew, plaintiff's husband, whose back was turned to
the truck, was struck and killed." 2
Plaintiff sued the manufacturer of the cab and chassis, Navistar
International Transportation Corp., under a theory of products liability,
claiming that the absence of a back-up alarm on a fertilizer truck was
a design defect. The trial court initially granted Navistar's motion for
summary judgment and held that the lack of an alarm was an open and
obvious defect and that a products liability action could not be founded

110. Id. at 10, 514 S.E.2d at 480.
111. 236 Ga. App. 89, 511 S.E.2d 204 (1999).
112. Id. at 89-90, 511 S.E.2d at 205-06.
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on such a defect."1 In the first Ogletree decision ("Ogletree I'),' 4 the
court of appeals reversed the trial court's initial grant of summary
judgment and held that Navistar did not establish that decedent
subjectively knew or appreciated the danger of a truck without a back-up
alarm." 5 The court of appeals overruled Ogletree I in Weatherby v.
Honda Motor Co.," 6 in which the court held "[that] to apply the open
and obvious rule the injured party did not need to know subjectively of
the danger but only objectively should have known."" 7 In Weatherby
the court of appeals specifically stated that summary judgment should
have been granted to Navistar in Ogletree .118
However, in the second Olgetree decision ("Ogletree I"), 1 the court
of appeals held that Navistar could not again seek summary judgment,
despite the decision in Weatherby, because the evidentiary posture of the
case had not changed. 2 ' After a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff and
an appeal by defendant, the court of appeals in the third Ogletree
decision ("Ogletree III").2' remanded the case to the trial court for a
ruling on defendants' motion for a new trial, which the trial court
denied.'2 2 In the fourth Ogletree decision ("Ogletree !VT")'2 the court
of appeals held that the decision in Weatherby controlled at that time,
that the evidence submitted at trial was materially different from the
evidence on motion for summary judgment, and that judgment should be
entered in favor of Navistar.'2 4 On appeal, the supreme court in the
fifth Ogletree decision ("Ogletree V") 125 overruled the court of appeals
decision in Ogletree IV on the basis that the decision in Banks v. ICI
Americas 2 6 implicitly overruled Weatherby. 27 The supreme court in
Ogletree V held that the openness and obviousness of a defect was not
the only determinative factor of a defective design suit and remanded
the case to the court of appeals.'28 Although not enumerated this way
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Id. at 90, 511 S.E.2d at 206.
194 Ga. App. 41, 390 S.E.2d 61 (1989).
Id. at 44-45, 390 S.E.2d at 65.
195 Ga. App. 169, 393 S.E.2d 64 (1990).
236 Ga. App. at 90, 511 S.E.2d at 206.
195 Ga. App. at 172, 393 S.E.2d at 67.
Ogletree v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 199 Ga. App. 699, 405 S.E.2d 884 (1991).
Id. at 701, 405 S.E.2d at 886.
Ogletree v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 221 Ga. App. 363, 471 S.E.2d 287 (1996).
Id. at 364, 471 S.E.2d at 288.
Ogletree v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 227 Ga. App. 11, 488 S.E.2d 97 (1997).
Id. at 15-17, 488 S.E.2d at 101.
Ogletree v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 269 Ga. 443, 500 S.E.2d 570 (1998).
264 Ga. 732, 450 S.E.2d 671 (1994).
269 Ga. at 444, 500 S.E.2d at 571.
Id. at 445-46, 500 S.E.2d at 571.
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in the case, the court of appeals decision on remand can properly be
referred to as "Ogletree VI."
In Ogletree VI the court of appeals applied the risk-utility analysis set
forth in Banks.2 Applying Banks and its risk-utility analysis, the
court of appeals noted that
"[the] risk-utility analysis incorporates the concept of 'reasonableness,'
i.e., whether the manufacturer acted reasonably in choosing a
particular product design, given the probability and seriousness of the
risk posed by the design, the usefulness of the product in that
condition, and the burden on the manufacturer to take the necessary
steps to eliminate the risk."3 °
In Banks the supreme court identified a non-exhaustive list of factors
that could be examined in applying the risk-utility analysis, including:
the usefulness of the product; the gravity and severity of the danger
posed by the design; the likelihood of that danger; the avoidability of
the danger, i.e., the user's knowledge of the product, publicity
surrounding the danger, or the efficacy of warnings, as well as common
knowledge and the expectation of danger; the user's ability to avoid
danger; the state of the art at the time the product is manufactured;
the ability to eliminate danger without impairing the usefulness of the
product or making it too expensive; and the feasibility of spreading the
loss in the setting of the product's price or by purchasing insurance.131
Applying these factors, the court of appeals found that the cab and
chassis could be used "for a variety of truck vehicles that did not need
the alarm[,]" that the decedent was "familiar with the truck's patent lack
of an alarm and aware of the dangers[,I" that "the decedent could have
avoided the danger by not turning his back on the vehicle[,]" that the
state of the art at the time the vehicle was manufactured did not require
the installation of an alarm as standard equipment, that "[t]he ability
to eliminate the danger without impairing the usefulness of the vehicle
was limited[,]" that defendant complied with applicable federal
regulations, and that the design could "be used without harm."'32
Based on these conclusions, the court held that application of the factors
set forth in Banks "negate[s] any possible finding of defective design. '
Moreover, although the openness and obviousness of the

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

236 Ga. App. at 91-92, 511 S.E.2d at 206-07.
Id. at 92, 511 S.E.2d at 207 (quoting Banks, 264 Ga. at 734, 450 S.E.2d at 673).
Banks, 264 Ga. at 736 n.6, 450 S.E.2d at 675 n.6.
236 Ga. App. at 93-94, 511 S.E.2d at 208.
Id. at 93, 511 S.E.2d at 208.
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defect is no longer the determinative factor, the court of appeals clearly
relied upon this factor as a significant consideration in applying the riskutility analysis."
In the seventh Ogletree decision ("Ogletree VII"), however, the supreme
court reversed the court of appeals on the basis that "there was some
evidence that the risk outweighed the utility of the cab and chassis
without the alarm."' 35 The court noted that "the adoption of the riskutility analysis in this state has actually increased the burden of a
defendant, in seeking a judgment as a matter of law, to show plainly and
indisputably an absence of any evidence that a product as designed is
defective."" 6 Accordingly, because some evidence could reasonably be
construed in favor of plaintiff, the court held that defendant was not
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'37
B.

Strict Product Liability and the Definition of Manufacturer
In Farmex, Inc. v. Wainwright, 8' the supreme court reversed the
decision of the court of appeals and held that a corporation that
continues to introduce into the stream of commerce a product manufactured by a predecessor corporation, but that does not itself continue to
manufacture that product, is not considered a manufacturer for strict
liability purposes.3 9 This case arose when a motorist was driving
behind a tractor trailer and was hit when the trailer came loose from the
tractor. The motorist sued the driver of the tractor trailer and the
driver's employer. The driver and his employer brought a third-party
complaint against Farmex because the accident occurred as a result of
the failure of a hitch pin thought to be manufactured by Farmex.
However, the pin was actually designed and distributed by an Ohio
corporation known as JA-BIL, Inc. JA-BIL had been part of an assetpurchase agreement under which Farmex purchased all the assets of JABIL. Plaintiffs added Farmex as a third-party defendant because
Farmex, through its purchase, had introduced the allegedly defective
hitch pin into the stream of commerce."

134. Id.
135. Ogletree v. Navistar Intl Transp. Corp., No. S99G0770, 1999 WL 824428, at *1
(Ga. Oct. 18, 1999).
136. Id. at *2.
137. Id. at *3.
138. 269 Ga. 548, 501 S.E.2d 802 (1998).
139. Id. at 550-51, 501 S.E.2d at 804.
140. Corbin v. Farmex, Inc., 227 Ga. App. 620, 620, 490 S.E.2d 395, 396-97 (1997).
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On appeal the court of appeals first noted that only manufacturers of
products are subject to liability under a strict liability theory of
recovery.'
However, the court then considered the circumstances
under which a corporation that has purchased the assets of another
corporation may be held liable for the torts of the predecessor corporation."
In reaching its decision, the court cited Bullington v. Union
Tool Corp.,' in which the supreme court held that "generally, a
purchasing corporation does not assume the liabilities of the seller
unless: (1) there is an agreement to assume liabilities; (2) the transaction is, in fact, a merger; (3) the transaction is a fraudulent attempt to
avoid liabilities; or (4) the purchaser is a mere continuation of the
predecessor corporation."'" Plaintiffs argued that the second and
fourth exceptions set forth in Bullington applied because Farmex merged
de facto with JA-BIL and continued the business of JA-BIL, but the
court of appeals rejected this argument. 45 First, the court noted that
a de facto merger, as defined by the court of appeals in Howard v.
APAC-Georgia, Inc.,'14 requires "'a continuity of shareholders,'" a
factor not present in the transaction in Farmex.14' Second, the court
rejected plaintiffs' argument that Farmex was a mere continuation of the
predecessor corporation in
that there was no identity of ownership
14
corporations.
the
between
Nevertheless, the court of appeals noted that other courts have
149
expanded successor liability based on public policy considerations.
The court outlined the public policy reasons that support strict liability
in tort as follows:
"(1) the manufacturer is better able to protect itself and bear the costs
while the consumer is helpless; (2) it is the manufacturer which has
launched the product [in question] into the channels of trade; (3) it is
the manufacturer which has violated the representation of safety
implicit in putting the product into the stream of commerce; and (4) the

141. Id. at 621, 490 S.E.2d at 397.
142. Id.
143. 254 Ga. 283, 328 S.E.2d 726 (1985).
144. 227 Ga. App. at 621, 490 S.E.2d at 397 (quoting Bullington, 254 Ga. at 284, 328
S.E.2d at 727).
145. Id. at 622, 490 S.E.2d at 397.

146. 192 Ga. App. 49, 383 S.E.2d 617 (1989).
147.

227 Ga. App. at 622,490 S.E.2d at 397 (quoting Howard, 192 Ga. App. at 50, 383

S.E.2d at 618).
148. Id., 490 S.E.2d at 398.
149. Id.
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manufacturer is the instrumentality to look to for improvement of the
product's quality."5 °

Based on these factors, the court found that there was evidence
presented by plaintiffs that Farmex had continued to manufacture the
same product line (although not the same hitch pin) as its predecessor
corporation and that Farmex had acquired the hitch pin and introduced
it into the stream of commerce.151 Based on this evidence, the court
held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to
Farmex.'52
However, the supreme court held that strict liability in tort
applies only to manufacturers of new products and does not apply to
product sellers unless the successor corporation is merely a continuation
of the predecessor manufacturer.153 The court noted that continuation
is found only in those situations in which there is some identity of
ownership between the predecessor and successor corporations."M The
court held that the facts of the case did not support that conclusion
because it was "undisputed that Farmex did not continue to design or
manufacture any hitch pins of the type that it acquired from JABIL."'5 5 Instead, Farmex continued only the general business of the
corporation by selling the inventory of hitch pins it had purchased.5 6'
The court concluded that because Farmex did not manufacture the
product, it would not be in the position to improve upon the quality of
the product, nor would it be in any position to examine the product for
any defects.'5 7 According to the court, Farmex should only be seen as
a wholesaler or retailer of the hitch pins and not as a manufacturer.'58
In this respect, the supreme court also noted that "until the General
Assembly acts, 5strict
liability is an available remedy only against a
'manufacturer.'"' 9 Until such legislative action occurs, Farmex, Inc.
v.Wainwright should quell any attempts to expand the continuation
theory in a strict liability context so as to impose liability on successor
corporations that purchase the assets of another corporation but do not
continue to manufacture the predecessor's allegedly defective product.
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Id. (quoting Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1154 (1st Cir. 1974)).
Id. at 623, 490 S.E.2d at 398.
Id., 490 S.E.2d at 399.
269 Ga. at 549, 501 S.E.2d at 803.
Id.
Id., 501 S.E.2d at 804.
Id.
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V. DEFAMATION
A. Defamation and a Request for Investigation by the Georgia Real
Estate Commission
In Skoglund v. Durham,"6 the court of appeals addressed the
question of whether statements made in a request to investigate with
the Georgia Real Estate Commission ("GREC"), as dictated by O.C.G.A.
section 43-40-27, are governed by the absolute privilege of O.C.G.A.
section 51-5-8.'
This case arose when plaintiff applied for a broker's
license with the GREC. Defendants filed a Request for Investigation in
which they alleged that plaintiff had been convicted of fraud in a past
transaction involving defendants. Plaintiff brought a defamation suit
against defendants as a result of the allegations set forth in defendants'
Request for Investigation.' 62 The trial court ultimately granted
summary judgment to defendants on the basis that "public policy
warrants the imposition of an absolute privilege for communications
made in the filing of a request for investigation with the GREC."'
Plaintiff appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment.' 64
On appeal, the court of appeals first noted that "[tihe issue before us
is one of first impression." 5 In affirming the decision of the trial
court, the court held that a Request for Investigation is privileged
because it meets the criteria of O.C.G.A. section 51-5-8 and the public
policy rationale of O.C.G.A. section 43-40-27.1m
The court cited
O.C.G.A. section 51-5-8 and stated that the privilege enumerated in that
section extends to pleadings, but that the definition of pleadings is not
limited to the definition of pleadings set forth in O.C.G.A. section 9-117(a). 167 In short, the court held that an absolute privilege extends to a
number of different pleadings outside the limited definition contained in
O.C.G.A. section 9-11-7(a), such as allegations in affidavits, protective
orders prepared by counsel, and notices of lis pendens.'" In its
analysis of whether a Request for Investigation falls within the
definition of privilege in O.C.G.A. section 51-5-8 but outside the
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233 Ga. App. 158, 502 S.E.2d 814 (1998).
Id. at 158-59, 502 S.E.2d at 815-16.
Id. at 158, 502 S.E.2d at 815.
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definition of pleadings in O.C.G.A. section 9-11-7(a), the court looked at
"the nature of the proceeding and the character of the rights which may
be affected by it."' 69 Under the provisions of O.C.G.A. section 43-4027(a), the court held that the Request for Investigation procedures of the
GREC satisfy the requirements necessary to constitute an absolute
For example, the court noted that the Request for
privilege. 70
Investigation process may involve the issuance of subpoenas and other
types of discovery, a hearing, and provisional review of the GREC's
findings in the superior courts.'
The court also found that an absolute privilege existed as to statements made in the GREC's Request for Investigation because of public
policy concerns. 172 The court quoted O.C.G.A. section 43-40-27 for the
proposition that fraudulent conduct is reason enough for a Request for
Investigation. 73 The court further held that the public policy purposes
served by these hearings are important and that defamation suits
arising out of such statements would possibly have a chilling effect on
investigations. 174 Additionally, the court noted that these hearings
were governed by confidentiality protections that would safeguard
claims in such an investigation
anyone from possible damage if the
7
proved to be untrue and malicious.1 1
B.

Defamation and FederalLabor Law

In Douglas v. Maddox, v6 plaintiff, a corporation, filed suit against
the local union and several of its officials because the union distributed
fliers during a union organization drive at plaintiff's facilities. Plaintiff
specifically complained about three fliers distributed by defendants that,
according to plaintiff, falsely claimed plaintiff had been indicted for a
sundry list of labor law violations. The evidence established that
criminal violations were never filed against plaintiff; however, the
a civil suit against plaintiff for
National Labor Relations Board had filed
177
certain alleged labor law infractions.
In reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendants, the court of appeals held that once the issue of labor law became
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Id. at 160, 502 S.E.2d at 816.
Id. at 159-60, 502 S.E.2d at 816.
Id. at 160, 502 S.E.2d 816.
Id., 502 S.E.2d at 817.
Id.
Id. at 161, 502 S.E.2d at 817.
233 Ga. App. 744, 505 S.E.2d 43 (1998).
Id. at 744, 505 S.E.2d at 43-44.
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central to the dispute, plaintiff could not avail itself of "Georgia's libel
law, or the remedies thereunder, unless [plaintiff] can show by clear and
convincing evidence" that the statements about them were circulated
with actual malice.178 The trial court held that plaintiff failed to
present sufficient evidence of actual malice; however, the court of
appeals disagreed.179
The court of appeals first noted that notwithstanding the heightened
"clear and convincing evidence" standard, "proof of actual malice 'does
not readily lend itself to summary disposition.'"18 According to the
court, "proof of actual malice brings into question a defendant's state of
mind, which can be determined based upon inferences drawn from
objective circumstances as well as direct evidence provided by a
defendant in a given case."' 8 ' When construed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, plaintiff, the facts showed that one
defendant was a veteran union organizer who was familiar with
National Labor Relations Board proceedings, who "admitted that he
knew such proceedings were civil in nature," and who "used the terms
'indicted' and 'indictment' in the fliers even though he knew that they
had a criminal meaning."182 Based on this evidence, the court concluded that a jury could conclude by clear and convincing evidence that
defendants "had published the fliers either knowing that the information
they contained was false or with a reckless disregard for whether the
information the fliers contained was true
or false, and thus, that
83
defendants had acted with actual malice."
VI. DOG BITE
In Supan v. Griffin,'" the court of appeals crafted an exception to
the "first bite" rule that has traditionally been raised as a defense by dog
owners sued as a result of a dog bite. 88 In doing so, the court of
appeals has severely undermined the viability of that rule as a defense
to liability. Plaintiff in Supan, a nine-year-old boy, was attacked by
defendant's "Rottweiler and Chow mix" dog while on defendant's
premises. Plaintiff and his father were at defendant's home after
transporting defendant's son to defendant's residence after the son had
178. Id. at 745, 505 S.E.2d at 44.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 746, 505 S.E.2d at 44 (quoting Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120
n.9 (1979)).
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Id., 505 S.E.2d at 45.
238 Ga. App. 404, 519 S.E.2d 22 (1999).
Id. at 404-05, 519 S.E.2d at 22.
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been involved in an automobile accident. Plaintiff brought suit against
defendant for injuries suffered as a result of the attack. Defendant
subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that
defendant had no prior knowledge of the dog's propensity to bite. 8'
In support of the motion for summary judgment, defendant submitted an
affidavit stating that the attack on plaintiff "was the first knowledge he
had of his dog's propensity to bite."18 7
Plaintiff responded to defendant's affidavit by submitting an affidavit
from a neighbor of defendant who testified that defendant's dog (along
with defendant's four or five other dogs) had come onto the neighbor's
front porch, attacked the neighbor's dog, and threatened the neighbor
with "'bared fangs, vicious growls and attack behavior.'" '
The
neighbor further testified that defendant had "'acknowledged that the
dogs were a problem and told [the neighbor] that if the dogs ever came
back on [the neighbor's] property, to do whatever was necessary ...to
keep the dogs from attacking and off of [the neighbor's] property.'"'8 9
Based on the affidavit from the neighbor, the trial court denied
defendant's motion for summary judgment.' 9
On appeal the court of appeals affirmed and held that the affidavit
from the neighbor "raises genuine issues of material fact as to [defendant's] prior knowledge of his dogs' tendency to attack humans." 9 '
The court likened the facts in Supan to the facts in McBride v.
Wasik,'92 in which "defendant pet owner's prior statement concerning
a desire for his dog to attack that plaintiff, without proof that the dog
had ever bitten anyone, raised genuine issues of material fact as to that
defendant's liability for his dog's subsequent attack." 93 On this same
basis the court distinguished Supan from the 1998 decision in Hamilton
v. Walker,'" in which the court of appeals "narrowly held that a dog's
aggressive and menacing behavior remains insufficient.., to show the
animal's propensity to bite."'95 The court further noted that "the true
test of liability in the case sub judice is [defendant's] superior knowledge

186. Id., 519 S.E.2d at 22-23.
187. Id. at 405, 519 S.E.2d at 23.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 406, 519 S.E.2d at 23.
190. Id. at 404, 519 S.E.2d at 22.
191. Id. at 406, 519 S.E.2d at 23.
192. 179 Ga. App. 244, 345 S.E.2d 921 (1986).
193. 238 Ga. App. at 406, 519 S.E.2d at 23.
194. 235 Ga. App. 635, 510 S.E.2d 120 (1998).

195. 238 Ga. App. at 406, 519 S.E.2d at 23.
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of his dog's temperament.""
On this basis, the court affirmed the
trial court's denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment.'97
Judge Andrews filed a dissent to the majority's opinion. 9 ' According
to Judge Andrews, the majority's opinion delivers a "coup de grace" to
the first bite rule as applied in the Georgia prior to the decision in
Supan.'" As Judge Andrews stated, "there is no evidence in the
record sufficient to infer that the owner of the dog ...

knew or should

have known of the dog's propensity to bite a human being.""' Moreover, Judge Andrews noted that prior to the decision in Supan the court
of appeals consistently held "that an owner's knowledge that his dog has
previously displayed menacing or aggressive behavior toward human
beings is not sufficient to support an inference that the owner knew or
should have known that the dog had a propensity to attack, bite, or
injure a human being."2 '
Because of the court of appeals longstanding reliance on the first bite rule, Judge Andrews rejected the
notion that an inference could be drawn that defendant knew or should
have known that his dog had a propensity to bite a human being based
upon his knowledge of the dog's prior behavior.20 2

196. Id.
197. Id., 519 S.E.2d at 23-24.
198. See id. at 407, 519 S.E.2d at 24 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 410, 519 S.E.2d at 26.
200. Id. at 407, 519 S.E.2d at 24. According to Judge Andrews:
There is absolutely no evidence in this case to support an inference that Supan
knew or should have known that the dog at issue had a propensity to attack or
bite a human being. The dog did not attack or bite [the neighbor] during the
incident described by [the neighbor] in his affidavit, nor is there any evidence that
the dog had attacked or bitten anyone prior to biting [plaintiff]. Supan's
statement to [the neighbor] that the dogs were a problem and that [the neighbor]
should do whatever was necessary to keep them from attacking showed nothing
more than Supan's acknowledgment of the incident which [the neighbor] had just
described to him in which the dogs attacked [the neighbor's] dog and displayed
menacing behavior toward [the neighbor] by baring their fangs and growling in
what [the neighbor] characterized as "attack behavior."
At most, Supan's statement to [the neighbor] showed that Supan knew the dogs
had displayed menacing behavior which [the neighbor] characterized as a threat
to attack him and showed Supan knew the dogs had actually attacked [the
neighbor's] dog. To interpret Supan's statement as evidence that he had
knowledge of the dog's propensity to attack or bite a human being - without any
evidence that the dog had previously attacked or bitten anyone - is sheer
sophistry. It creates an inference based on pure speculation, conjecture or
possibility, which this court has recognized is insufficient to create a genuine issue
of fact.
Id. at 408, 519 S.E.2d at 24-25.
201. Id. at 409, 519 S.E.2d at 25.
202. Id. at 408-09, 519 S.E.2d at 25.
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Judge Andrews also rejected the majority's reliance upon the decision
in McBride. 3 According to the majority opinion, the decision in
McBride stood for the proposition that prior statements by a dog owner
of the animal's propensity to attack human beings may form a basis for
a genuine issue of material fact as to the dog owner's liability for the
dog's subsequent attack on a human being.2°4 Judge Andrews, however, rejected this reading of McBride.2 5 According to Judge Andrews,
although the dog in McBride had never previously bitten or attacked a
person, the dog was a trained attack dog. 2" Moreover, evidence had
been submitted that the dog's owner "had previously commanded the dog
to attack the victim's wife ... and that the dog charged on this

command but was called off by the owner before it reached the victim's
wife." °7 According to Judge Andrews, the evidence in McBride
"showed an owner who knew his dog was specifically trained for and had
the ability and willingness to attack and injure a human being."20 8 In
contrast, Judge Andrews noted that the dog in Supan "was neither a
trained attack or fighting dog, nor had the dog previously grabbed people
with its
mouth, 'nipped' people, or ripped people's clothes with its
2 9

teeth."

0

Finally, Judge Andrews harshly criticized the majority's apparent
unwillingness to take into account the public policy underlying the first
bite rule.
The rule under which dog owners are protected from liability for
their dog's "first bite" sets a reasonably clear standard by which owners
can gauge the risk of second bite liability posed by owning a dog known
to have engaged in prior acts of biting or like conduct. The test of
liability set forth in the majority opinion creates a vague standard
under which first bite liability may be imposed on dog owners whose
dogs have never previously engaged in biting or like conduct, but
whose dogs had engaged in known conduct which might be subjectively
characterized as indicative of a vicious tendency or temperament.
Under the majority opinion, every dog owner in the state whose dog
has growled and bared his fangs may now be subject to first bite
liability based on a claim that the dog has a known vicious tendency or
temperament. This test dramatically increases the risk of liability
arisingfrom dog ownership while making it virtually impossible for dog

203. Id. at 409-10, 519 S.E.2d at 26.
204. 238 Ga. App. at 406, 519 S.E.2d at 23.
205. Id. at 410, 519 S.E.2d at 26 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
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208.
209.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
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owners to determine when their dog's conduct has placed them at
increased risk.210
VII.

CONCLUSION

The ostensible and primary purpose of the law is to provide rules by
which we may judge and guide our behavior. However, as evidenced by
the supreme court's 1997 decision in Robinson v. Kroger Co.,211 the
increasing trend to thrust all decisions to the jury under the auspices of
"questions of fact" threatens this very core purpose. The Georgia
Supreme Court and the Georgia Court of Appeals, as evidenced by many
of the decisions included in this Article, appear increasingly willing to
deconstruct basic standards of conduct that have guided the behavior of
businesses and individuals for years. Although the jury plays a
significant, central, and fundamental role in resolving disputed issues of
fact, the courts should not shy away from establishing firm standards of
conduct by which individuals and entities may govern their actions and
from applying those standards in cases in which the material facts are
not in dispute.

210. Id. at 411-12, 519 S.E.2d at 27 (emphasis added).
211. 268 Ga. 735, 493 S.E.2d 403 (1997).

